Without a European War that took out France and the Netherlands and had the attention of the UK, and had the USSR fighting for its life, Japan doesn't take the risk.
Note that despite the war between the USSR and Germany, Japan never poked the Russian bear, even when it was apparently on the ropes in 1941/1942, the result of thoroughly getting its ass handed to it in 1939 at Khalkhin Gol courtesy of Zhukov and the Red Army. That cautiousness would likely have extended to European powers not distracted by events at home.
Consider the strategic situation: Japan attacked Pearl Harbor because they needed to cripple the American fleet, because they had to attack the Philippines. They had to attack the Philippines because they needed to secure their flank in order to grab Indonesia and Indochina for their resources. But that meant they had to attack Hong Kong and Singapore to also secure their flanks. So they're already at war with Americans and the British. Attacking Indochina means bringing in the French. Attacking Indonesia means now the Dutch are in the mix as well, as they were in reality (although they were curb-stomped).
Just on the naval front, in 1939 the Royal Navy was still the largest in the world, with 15 battleships (+9 under construction), 7 carriers (+6 under construction), 65 cruisers of all sizes (+26 under construction), 113 modern destroyers (+24), 53 modern subs (+11).
The French had 7 battleships (+4), 1 aircraft carrier (+1), 19 cruisers (+3), 78 destroyers (+27), and 81 subs (+38).
By late 1941, the US had 17 battleships (+15), 7 carriers (+11), 43 cruisers (+40), 171 destroyers (+188), and 114 subs (+79).
The Japanese Navy, in December 1941, had 10 battleships (+3), 12 carriers (+7), 38 cruisers (+6), 126 destroyers (+43), and 68 fleet subs.
So, what does that mean? On the naval front, and using only the 1939 French and British numbers, in December 1941 the Japanese are outnumbered:
- 39 to 10 in battleships;
- 22 to 12 in carriers (given the superiority of Japanese naval aviation, this is actually pretty close, if not in Japan's favour);
- 127 to 38 in cruisers;
- 362 to 126 in destroyers; and
- 248 to 66 in submarines.
Now the Japanese had advantages: naval aviation, as mentioned, and the Long Lance, but quantity has a quality of its own. The Japanese could count, and they knew that in a prolonged struggle they'd be stomped by American and British shipbuilding, so the numbers would always get worse.
And then that doesn't get to the sizes of the merchant marines that could carry supplies and troops to the front, nor the air forces and armies.
The question was whether the suicidally overconfident military government in 1941 looks around and realizes they don't have an opening. In 1941, they could fool themselves into thinking the French were out of it, the British were on the ropes, the Dutch weren't worth worrying about, and the Americans didn't really have skin in the game aside from a quasi-colonial status with the Philippines, so they might be convinced to back down. With the British not distracted, the French with colonies they would fight hard to keep, and the Americans still the same threat, things are different. I suspect they would have swallowed their pride and tried to negotiate a way out.