Timeline for Minimum force needed for an air strike against a wind farm?
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
17 events
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Apr 27, 2021 at 14:57 | comment | added | TheDyingOfLight | @user2357112 supports Monica Even in a full fledged war there is value in denying responsibility. You could leave evidence framing an as of yet uninvolved faction. Think of what the Zimmermann Telegramm did in the first world war. | |
Apr 27, 2021 at 14:15 | comment | added | Codes with Hammer | @Christian You're almost certainly right about "barely functioning" -- but what about the software? :) | |
Apr 26, 2021 at 18:56 | comment | added | user2357112 | "Additionally bombing on that scale is so 1944 and one can't even deny responsibility." - I think you may have misunderstood the strategic situation. This is a full-scale war. Denying responsibility is not an issue. | |
Apr 26, 2021 at 15:10 | comment | added | Chris H | @StevenWaterman wired internet or wireless per turbine, I wonder. I'm thinking missiles or better (cheaper) glide bombs homing on the connection signals, geo-fenced with GPS so they don't aim for all the mobile phones in the next town. A warhead like in an air-to-air missile, with a proximity fuse should shred the aerodynamic surfaces enough to take them out. That would work even if your cyber-warfare capability wasn't up to the job, or you couldn't get the necessary insider. Maybe they even radiate on some other frequency if wired | |
Apr 26, 2021 at 11:31 | comment | added | TheDyingOfLight | @forest Well, remote hacking was always going to be difficult. But, sending in a team, taking out the facilities personal and then delivering the malware directly into the system, still seams to beat dropping hundreds of missiles or sending an equal number of ground-pounders with demolition charges. Or are there any major hurdles to this, once we control the facility? | |
Apr 26, 2021 at 9:22 | comment | added | Hobbamok | @forest the thing is: is the enemy aware that the windmills are a strategic target AND is the conflict open enough for the military to interfere with private assets? because if you open the war with this digital surprise attack it could work | |
Apr 25, 2021 at 21:49 | comment | added | forest | "Cyber security" person here. This really wouldn't be effective unless the enemy was caught unprepared. If the conflict has been simmering for a long time, you can bet that the ICS would be airgapped (it doesn't take all that much software to control these things). Stuxnet was delivered by hand (via USB device), so it would be much more difficult if you didn't have people who could covertly sabotage the network. | |
Apr 25, 2021 at 9:30 | comment | added | Crazymoomin | What you'd probably need to do is wait for a really stormy night with very strong winds, and make sure all the turbines are "on" (brakes off, clutches engaged, breakers closed). The turbines will spin so fast the grease in the gearbox overheats and catches fire, or the blades explosively shatter (it's happened). Bonus points if you overload the substation with a surge of electricity causing that to catch fire too. Now there's 200 turbines with their nacelles ablaze or destroyed, many of which will topple over due to the heat or shock, plus hopefully a burning substation or two. | |
Apr 25, 2021 at 9:23 | comment | added | Steven Waterman | Stuxnet comes to mind. The turbines are internet connected, infect them with a virus to disable the brakes that are used under high winds, leading to catastrophic self-destruction | |
Apr 25, 2021 at 7:21 | comment | added | Christian | @TheDyingOfLight The 3 steps of industrial bug fixing: "Why is this not working? Why is this working? Why did nobody notice that this is not working?" | |
Apr 25, 2021 at 7:14 | comment | added | John Dvorak | @Christian ideally the turbines themselves should be airgapped ... but you want telemetry, so probably a stock pi running stock linux with trivial software sending UDP packets to the control center ... without a firewall because the control center is secure enough ... secured by the firewall that the vendor didn't install because it's the client's responsibility, and that the client didn't install either because it's the vendor's responsibility. I'd question "barely functioning", but "completely unsecured" is entirely plausible. | |
Apr 25, 2021 at 7:13 | comment | added | TheDyingOfLight | @Christian I there any kind of software that isn't just barely functioning? xD | |
Apr 25, 2021 at 6:57 | comment | added | Christian | well I know the kind of people who write software for wind turbines. I'm certain they are barly functioning, let alone security proof. | |
Apr 24, 2021 at 20:14 | comment | added | Michael Seifert | I wonder whether wind turbines are susceptible to a software vulnerability such as that exploited in the Aurora Generator Test. I would suspect that the people who would know aren't telling, though. | |
Apr 24, 2021 at 17:37 | history | edited | TheDyingOfLight | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
added 11 characters in body
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Apr 24, 2021 at 17:32 | comment | added | Paul TIKI | Interesting approach. Keeps in mind that the ultimate goal is to deny the enemy use of this resource (the wind farm) Nothing spectacular needed. | |
Apr 24, 2021 at 16:33 | history | answered | TheDyingOfLight | CC BY-SA 4.0 |