Timeline for Way to prove you are human when the Turing test is not sufficient
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
10 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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| Feb 5, 2020 at 12:03 | comment | added | Hobbamok | This is the only valid answer, it's sad that OP marked a different one as correct. | |
| Feb 5, 2020 at 11:02 | comment | added | Ruadhan | I've put together an answer with a more sophisticated password system which I believe resolves most of the issues here. The gist is dual-passwords on a one-time pad. Each human maintains a unique list for each other human they expect to talk to and after each communication they destroy the password they used. | |
| Feb 4, 2020 at 18:21 | comment | added | DreadedEntity | +1 because this could not only stop AI, but also real humans who shouldn't be there. Combine this with biometric scanning and it becomes virtually unbreakable. Give employees a badge that contains an RSA public key, private key remains on the central server. Perform further authentication against certificate made by central server (essentially another RSA keypair). Badges need to be slotted into devices, like an ATM (NO WIRELESS obviously). First of all it requires a real physical being, that already defeats the AI. Then you have double RSA keypair and an encrypted connection to deal with | |
| Feb 4, 2020 at 14:01 | comment | added | Carson Graham | you would have an interesting problem dealing with refreshing one-time-pads as the OTP must be as big as the message it is encrypting, which means if you have a 10-char key and you sent a 5-char message, you would only have 5 more bytes to send a new OTP key. There might be a way, though | |
| Feb 4, 2020 at 13:58 | comment | added | Carson Graham | Proper RSA keys could solve your verification problem - give each user a key that they keep on a private smart card - impossible to retrieve with software, difficult to retrieve with hardware. To authenticate, have the humans sign their messages, preferable on a low-end laptop disconnected from any sort of network (ie, physically remove the network card and the ethernet jack). When a new human arrives, the existing ones tell the station back on earth that the new key is actually a human. This is all cryptographicly secure and there's no way to spoof it wiki article: tinyurl.com/khxahwa | |
| Feb 3, 2020 at 16:57 | comment | added | Nuclear Hoagie | @VLAZ A one time pad solves this problem. Send each human to the space station with a set of random encryption keys that change with every message sent. There is nothing to overhear, and no pattern that can be learned - as long as the pad is kept safe from the AI, it's uncrackable. | |
| Feb 3, 2020 at 13:57 | comment | added | In Hoc Signo | @Douwe The OP assumes that "Skynet" can spoof any data. Also, VLAZ is right: "Skynet" can surely pick up on any password, and replicate it after the first use. | |
| Feb 3, 2020 at 13:08 | comment | added | Douwe | @VLAZ, that's only IF the AI has the possibility to change its own features to such an extent that it can pass as someone else. I would have a harder time proving I'm not a robot then I would proving I'm not Taylor Swift. I think this idea has a lot of merit within the scope of OP's question. | |
| Feb 3, 2020 at 11:48 | comment | added | VLAZ | I struggle to think of an authentication method that's not spoofable to an AI. Assumption - the AI can receive input from the station. If it's a password, then the AI can overhear it. If it's a biometric scanner - the AI can already pretend to be a physical human, surely feeding false biometric reading is not too hard. If it's something the human possesses like a chip or whatever - that's fallible the same way as biometric data is. Possibly you can have challenge that requires some dynamic response to be computed but if the AI figures out the pattern, that's moot. | |
| Feb 3, 2020 at 11:00 | history | answered | Emilio M Bumachar | CC BY-SA 4.0 |